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Abstract 
 
The classification of a financial instrument as “debt” or as “equity” is crucial in applying a wide range of 
income tax provisions.  “Interest” expenses incurred on “debt,” for example, are deductible in computing 
a firm‟s taxable income, whereas “dividends” paid on the firm‟s outstanding “equity” are not.  “Interest” 
paid by a U.S. corporation to a foreign creditor is generally not subject to U.S. withholding taxes, whereas 
“dividends” paid on stock held by a foreign shareholder are typically subject to U.S. withholding taxes that 
range from 5% to 30% of the gross amount of the dividend paid.  And the list goes on . . . .   Not 
surprisingly, these disparities in tax treatment have inspired a plethora of schemes, many of them 
successful, designed to disguise equity investments as “debt.”  The urge to do so is perhaps nowhere more 
intense than in situations where the “debt” of a U.S. corporation is held by a foreign sister corporation 
located in a tax haven country.  Interest paid or accrued on debt would be deductible in computing the U.S. 
corporation‟s U.S. taxable income, and would thereby permanently reduce the debtor‟s U.S. tax liability.  
The interest income earned by the foreign creditor would be exempt from both U.S. withholding taxes and 
income taxes in the foreign tax haven country.  This interdisciplinary case was developed from the facts 
and circumstances before the U.S. Tax Court in litigation that resulted from the government‟s assertion 
that $975 million in “loans” made by a wholly owned Dutch subsidiary of Laidlaw Transit, Ltd. to several 
of Laidlaw‟s U.S. subsidiaries were in substance “equity.”   As in most debt-versus-equity cases, the stakes 
were high:  Laidlaw‟s U.S. subsidiaries had deducted over $133 million of intercompany “payments” made 
to their Dutch sister corporation as “interest expense” and the IRS was suing to recover $52 million in 
back taxes (plus interest and penalties).  This case integrates three disciplines – tax accounting, financial 
accounting, and finance -- in an easy-to-comprehend, yet rich setting appropriate for general management, 
finance, and accounting audiences.  It invites students to thoroughly explore the substance-over-form 
doctrine as it applies to the debt-versus-equity issue, together with many of the tax, financial, accounting, 
and economic ramifications that flow from an instrument‟s classification.  It also provides students with an 
opportunity to identify the ethical issues that attend the formulation and implementation of many tax 
minimization strategies and to identify factors that separate legal “tax avoidance” from criminal “tax 
evasion.” 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he classification of a financial instrument as “debt” or as “equity” is crucial in applying a wide range 
of income tax provisions.  Interest expenses incurred on “debt,” for example, are deductible in 
computing a firm’s taxable income, whereas dividends paid on the firm’s outstanding “equity” are 
not.  “Interest” paid by a U.S. corporation to a foreign creditor is generally not subject to U.S. withholding taxes, 
whereas dividends paid on stock held by a foreign shareholder are typically subject to U.S. withholding taxes that 
T 
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range from 5% to 30% of the gross amount of the dividend paid.
1
  And the list goes on . . . . 
 
Not surprisingly, the disparity in the tax treatment of “interest” versus ”dividends” has inspired a plethora 
of schemes, many of them successful, that attempt to disguise true equity as “debt.”  The urge to do so is perhaps 
nowhere more intense than in situations where the “debt” of a U.S. corporation is held by a foreign sister corporation 
located in a tax haven country.  Interest paid or accrued on debt would be deductible in computing the U.S. 
corporation’s U.S. taxable income, and would thereby permanently reduce the debtor’s U.S. tax liability, but the 
foreign creditor would not be subject to either U.S. withholding taxes or to income taxes in the foreign tax haven 
country. 
 
Distinguishing between “debt” and “equity” has become increasingly problematic. 
 
“Generally, we must recognize that the line between equity and debt has become increasingly fuzzy in recent years. 
Convertible debt has always had an intermediate character, but now there is almost a continuum of securities 
varying in their relative proportions of debt and equity flavoring.”2  
 
The numerous attempts by Congress and the Treasury Department throughout the last 50 years to establish 
bright line tests for distinguishing between debt and equity have each ended in failure.  The task of classifying 
instruments has instead, by default, been relegated to the courts, where the various factors deemed relevant in 
classifying a particular instrument,
3
 and the relative weight given to each factor, have varied widely from one case to 
the next and from one jurisdiction to another. 
 
Case Objectives 
 
This interdisciplinary case was developed largely from the facts and circumstances before the U.S. Tax 
Court in litigation that resulted from the government’s assertion that $975 million in “loans” made by a wholly 
owned Dutch subsidiary of Laidlaw Transit, Ltd.
4
 to several of Laidlaw’s U.S. subsidiaries were in substance 
“equity.”5  At stake was the proper classification of over $133 million of intercompany payments made by Laidlaw 
(a U.S. corporation) to a sister corporation located in a tax haven country.  If characterized as payments on debt, the 
amounts would be deductible by the U.S. debtor corporation and permanently reduce Laidlaw’s U.S. tax liability by 
over $45 million.  These payments would also be exempt from the $6.65 million in U.S. withholding taxes that 
would otherwise be due if the payments were reclassified as dividends.
6
  Conversely, if the instrument on which the 
underlying payments were made was determined to be “equity,” the payments would be treated as nondeductible 
dividends and they would be subject to substantial U.S. withholding taxes when paid to the foreign creditor. 
 
This case integrates three disciplines:  tax law, financial accounting, and corporate finance.  It provides tax, 
accounting, finance, and general management students with an easy-to-comprehend, yet robust setting through 
which to explore the application of one of the most pervasive doctrines of tax jurisprudence and of financial 
accounting:  the “substance-over-form” doctrine.  In this case, students will apply this doctrine to one of the most 
widespread and persistently troublesome issues in the field of taxation:  distinguishing between “debt” and “equity.”  
Although this case addresses that issue in the context of U.S. tax law, the tax laws of most industrialized nations also 
treat debt (and interest) differently from equity (and dividends) and, like the U.S., they typically resolve the 
                                                          
1 The withholding rate on dividends is a function of the tax treaty in effect between the United States and the country in which a foreign 
shareholder is domiciled.  Where there is no tax treaty between the two countries, the statutory withholding rate is a flat 30%.  
2 Statement By Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System, Before The Committee On Finance, U.S. 
Senate (January 26, 1989) (89 Tax Notes Today 21-9 (January  27, 1989)). 
3 E.g., whether or not there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money, whether 
the rate of interest is fixed or contingent, whether the obligation is subordinated to debt held by unrelated parties, the corporation's debt-to-equity 
ratio, whether the instrument is convertible into the stock of the corporation, the between the holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of 
the interest in question, etc. 
4 Laidlaw Transit, Ltd. was a publicly traded Canadian corporation.  Its name has since been changed first to Laidlaw, Inc. and then, in 
2003 following its emergence from bankruptcy, to Laidlaw International, Inc. 
5 Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. v Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, TCM 1998-232. 
6 Under the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty, dividends paid by a U.S. corporation to a Netherlands shareholder were subject to a 5% 
withholding tax. 
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classification of ambiguous financial instruments by looking to substance, rather than form. 
 
This case requires minimal understanding of the technical tax or financial accounting rules governing the 
treatment of debt/interest and equity/dividends.  It requires students to focus on the many qualitative and quantitative 
attributes that distinguish one from the other, and, as noted above, it highlights two of the many substantial tax 
consequences that result from the classification of a financial instrument as debt or as equity.  Many students will be 
surprised to discover that the form of a transaction and the labels assigned by the parties do not necessarily control 
the tax or financial accounting treatment where the “substance” of a transaction or financial instrument is at odds 
with its “form.” 
 
The actions of the Laidlaw executives and their tax advisors also provide an opportunity for students to 
explore the distinction between legal “tax avoidance” and criminal “tax evasion,” together with the ethical issues 
that frequently arise in the course of developing and implementing tax minimization strategies. 
 
This case is designed for use in any graduate or upper-level undergraduate corporate finance, financial 
accounting, or tax strategy course in which the tax, financial accounting, or economic consequences of corporate 
debt and/or corporate equity are addressed.  Although the barebones issues can be addressed in a single class, the 
authors prefer to teach this case over two 60-minute sessions,.  For the first session, we ask students to read the case 
and sketch out discussion points for each of the Background Questions.  Although most finance, management, and 
accounting students will have had little, if any, formal exposure to tax law, it has been our experience that most have 
enough general background to appreciate the issues and to contribute meaningfully to this discussion.  We use the 
second session to build on this background and to focus on the issues that are specific to the Laidlaw case. 
 
The teaching note for this case is both comprehensive and detailed.  It provides a considerable amount of 
background material that non-tax, non-accounting faculty may find especially helpful.  University professors can 
receive an electronic copy of this note from the authors by e-mailing their request to dlarue@virginia.edu. 
 
Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. 
 
Born in 1933 in Torhout, Belgium, Michael DeGroote and his parents immigrated to Canada in 1947.  They 
settled in the village of Langdon, Ontario, where 14-year-old Michael started working in the tobacco fields.  The 
long hours of back-breaking labor taught him the value of hard work and kindled an entrepreneurial spirit that would 
fuel his rise to the very peak of Canada's business elite.  
 
When DeGroote was 18, he bought a second-hand army truck and began hauling manure for local farmers.  
One truck soon grew to four, then six, then ten, and in 1959 he made his first major strategic move when he acquired 
all of the stock of Laidlaw Motor Sales, Ltd. and Hepburn Transport Ltd.  In 1966, Hepburn Transport Ltd. merged 
into Laidlaw Motor Sales, Ltd., which later became Laidlaw Transportation, Ltd. (“Laidlaw”).7   
 
Through DeGroote's aggressive merger and acquisition campaign, Laidlaw and its subsidiaries grew rapidly 
before and during the years in issue (September 1, 1985-August 31, 1988).
8
  It eventually acquired over 500 other 
Canadian and U.S. firms in the trucking, solid waste disposal, and passenger bus and school bus service businesses.   
 
These businesses typically used heavy vehicles to transport materials or people and needed governmental 
licenses or permits to operate.  DeGroote, who served as president and chairman of Laidlaw from the time it was 
formed until August l, 1990,
9
 believed that the fastest way to expand in these businesses was to buy small privately-
held businesses which had existing licenses and permits.  By the mid- to late-1980’s, Laidlaw and its subsidiaries 
                                                          
7 On January 1, 1990, Laidlaw Transit, Ltd. changed its name to Laidlaw Inc.  In 2001, it filed for bankruptcy protection and emerged 
two years later as Laidlaw International, Inc. 
8 Laidlaw and its subsidiaries used a fiscal year ending on August 31 for both financial reporting and tax purposes. 
9 DeGroote owned no less than 50.5 percent of the voting stock of Laidlaw from the time it went public in 1969 though May 1988.  
Ownership of Laidlaw's other voting stock was widely dispersed.  In May 1988, Canadian Pacific, Ltd., the Canadian transportation 
conglomerate, bought 47.2 percent of the voting stock of Laidlaw from DeGroote for C$499 million. 
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had grown to become the largest provider of school bus transportation services in North America, the third largest 
provider of solid waste disposal services in the United States, and the second or third largest provider of hazardous 
waste disposal services in the United States.   
 
Laidlaw financed its expansion in the United States by lending money and contributing capital to its 
subsidiaries in the United States.  Before 1969, Laidlaw financed its growth primarily with its own earnings and 
loans from banks and finance companies.  Laidlaw first made a public offering of its stock in 1969 and used the 
capital it raised to repay bank debts and buy more businesses.  Eventually, Laidlaw stock was traded on stock 
exchanges in both Canada and the United States.
10
 
 
The core management team of Laidlaw and its various subsidiaries during the years in issue consisted of 
DeGroote, Leslie W. Haworth, and Ivan R. Cairns.  Haworth became Laidlaw's senior financial officer in 1972 and 
later became senior vice president for finance.  Cairns became Laidlaw's vice president, general counsel, and 
secretary in 1981. He later became senior vice president. Cairns and Haworth were DeGroote's two closest advisors 
on acquisitions, financing, and other matters.  Throughout the years in issue, they were directors and officers of 
Laidlaw and of each of the subsidiaries relevant in this case.  DeGroote was chairman of all of the Laidlaw 
companies. 
 
Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. and Its Subsidiaries 
 
Throughout the years in issue, Laidlaw, owned all of the stock of Laidlaw Transportation, Inc. (“L_US”), a 
U.S. holding company formed in 1977.
11
  L_US owned all of the stock of Laidlaw Transit, Inc. (“L_Transit”),12 
which, along with its numerous subsidiaries, was actively engaged in the passenger and school bus transportation 
businesses.  In 1987, L_US purchased all of the stock Monroe Tree and Lawntender, Inc. for $16 million and 
renamed it Laidlaw Tree Service, Inc. (“L_Tree”).13  
 
In 1981, L_US formed Laidlaw Industries, Inc. (“L_Industries”) as a holding company for Laidlaw’s U.S. 
and Canadian solid waste services operations.
14
  In 1982, 21% of the stock of L_Industries was sold to the public.  
This stock was re-acquired by L_Industries on December 16, 1987.  L_Industries owned all of the stock of Laidlaw 
Waste Systems, Inc. (“L_Waste”).15  In 1987, L_Waste purchased all of the stock of GSX Corporation. 
 
The transportation and waste services industries are capital-intensive.  L_US’s operating subsidiaries 
constantly needed large amounts of long-term capital to buy trucks and buses and to improve landfill sites. None of 
these businesses could afford to eliminate or significantly reduce their capital spending for any substantial period of 
time without seriously impairing their business operations.  
 
The Coopers and Lybrand Tax Plan 
 
By the mid-1980's Laidlaw was competing intensely with Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. and Waste 
Management, Inc. to buy solid waste services businesses.  In the summer of 1985, DeGroote, Cairns, and Haworth 
asked Coopers & Lybrand (“C&L”) to develop a tax strategy that would help Laidlaw compete more effectively 
with Browning-Ferris and Waste Management in buying U.S. companies. 
 
                                                          
10   Trading was suspended in 2002, shortly after Laidlaw filed for bankruptcy protection in Canada and the U.S. 
11   DeGroote, Haworth, Ronald S. Murray (Murray), and Douglas R. Gowland (Gowland) were the directors of L_US.  DeGroote was 
president, Gowland was senior vice president for solid waste services, Murray was vice president, Haworth was vice president for 
finance, and Cairns was secretary. 
12   DeGroote, Haworth, and Victor A. Webster (Webster) were L_Transit's directors and its officers included DeGroote as chief executive 
officer, Webster as president, Haworth as vice president for finance, and Cairns as secretary. 
13   DeGroote, Haworth, and Gowland were directors of L_Tree and its officers included Gowland as chairman, Haworth as vice president 
for finance, and Cairns as secretary. 
14  DeGroote, Haworth, Gowland, and Murray (and others) were directors of L_Industries and its officers included Gowland as president, 
Haworth was vice president for finance, and Cairns was secretary, vice president, and general counsel. 
15   L_Waste's only directors were DeGroote, Gowland, and Haworth and its officers included Gowland as president, Haworth as vice 
president for finance, and Cairns as secretary. 
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C&L suggested a plan that was designed to enable Laidlaw to finance a significant portion of its 
acquisitions with pre-tax dollars, rather than with after-tax dollars.
16
  This could be achieved as follows:   
 
 Laidlaw would form a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary which, in turn, would form a wholly owned 
Netherlands subsidiary.  
 Laidlaw would then borrow funds from various commercial banks in Canada and then contribute these 
funds to the capital of the new Canadian subsidiary.   
 These funds would then be transferred by the Canadian subsidiary to the Netherlands subsidiary as capital 
contributions and interest-free loans.   
 Finally, the Netherlands subsidiary would advance these funds to Laidlaw’s U.S. subsidiaries as interest-
bearing debt, the proceeds of which would be used by those subsidiaries to effect the acquisitions. 
 
According to C&L, Laidlaw, in computing its Canadian income tax liability, could deduct the interest it 
paid on the funds it borrowed to invest in the Canadian subsidiary, and the U.S. subsidiaries could deduct the 
interest they paid or accrued on the loans made to them by the Netherlands subsidiary in computing their U.S. 
                                                          
16 For all of the years in issue, the marginal U.S. income tax rate applicable to the consolidated earnings of Laidlaw’s U.S. subsidiaries 
was 46%.   
For federal income tax purposes, “affiliated groups” of U.S. corporations can elect to file consolidated income tax returns with their 80%-or-
greater owned U.S. subsidiaries.  In stark contrast to the accounting rules governing consolidated financial statements, with require the 
consolidation of foreign subsidiaries, foreign subsidiaries are neither required nor permitted to join with its U.S. affiliates in filing the U.S. 
consolidate return.  One of the many consequences of this prohibition is that interest paid or accrued by U.S. affiliates to their foreign affiliates is 
not “eliminated” in the computation of the U.S. group’s consolidated taxable income. 
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income tax liability.  Furthermore, the income that the Netherlands subsidiary would derive from the payments of 
interest made by the U.S. subsidiaries on these loans would be exempt from U.S. withholding taxes
17
 and, under 
Dutch tax laws, subject to little or no tax in the Netherlands.
18
   When the smoke cleared, the Laidlaw group would 
have what C&L called a "double deduction" of interest expense (interest deduction in both Canada and the U.S.), 
with minimal income tax liabilities in The Netherlands. 
 
Formation Of L_Investments And L_Netherlands 
 
On September 25, 1985, Laidlaw formed Laidlaw Investments, Ltd. (“L_Investments”), a Canadian 
corporation with Laidlaw as its sole shareholder.
19
  L_Investments sole sources of funds during the years in issue 
were the capital contributions made to it by Laidlaw and Laidlaw’s other subsidiaries.  
 
On December 30, 1985 L_Investments formed Laidlaw International Investments B.V. (“L_Netherlands”) 
in The Netherlands as a 100-percent owned subsidiary.
20
 
 
Advances at Issue 
 
Throughout the years in issue, L_Netherlands' primary activity was to receive funds from L_Investments 
and, on the same or next day, transfer those funds to Laidlaw’s U.S. subsidiaries that had requested them:  L_Waste, 
L_Tree, and L_Transit (“U.S. Subsidiaries”).  L_Netherlands advanced funds only to the U.S. Subsidiaries (and 
never to unrelated parties), and its funds came exclusively from Laidlaw (via L_Investments) and from “interest 
payments” received from the U.S. Subsidiaries. 
 
When a U.S. Subsidiary asked for an advance, L_Netherlands would request L_Investments to provide 
funds for the transaction. Written agreements between L-Investments and L-Netherlands generally required L-
Investments to provide funds requested by L-Netherlands, as long as those amounts were no more than the amounts 
requested by the U.S. Subsidiaries.  L_Investments advanced those funds to L_Netherlands, which, in order to 
comply with certain Dutch tax rulings that required it to maintain its debt-to-equity ratio within a specified range, 
recorded them on its books as interest-free demand loans and as capital contributions in proportions designated by 
C&L.   The February 18, 1986 advance to L_Transit was typical. 
 
 L_Transit requested an $18 million advance from L-Netherlands.  
 Laidlaw transferred $18 million it had received from an earlier issue of its preferred shares21 to L-
Investments in exchange for additional shares of L-Investments stock.
22
  
 L-Investments transferred $18 million to L-Netherlands in exchange for additional stock and non-interest-
bearing notes.  
 L-Netherlands transferred $18 million to L_Transit in exchange for an $18 million interest-bearing note.  
 
                                                          
17 Foreign corporations earning passive investment-type income from U.S. sources are generally subject to income taxes at a flat 30% 
tax rate imposed on the gross amount of the income.  In order to actually collect the U.S. income taxes owed by foreign taxpayers, the U.S., like 
most countries, requires U.S. payor corporations to withhold the required taxes from the payments they make to foreign corporations, and to pay 
these withheld amounts over to the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of the foreign payee. 
Tax treaties between the U.S. and each of over 40 countries around the world typically contain provisions that substantially reduce the 
withholding tax rate on certain types of income.  Under the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty in effect throughout the years in issue, the treaty rate on 
interest income received by a foreign corporation from a U.S. corporation was 0%, while the tax rate applicable to dividends paid by a U.S. 
corporation to its foreign parent corporation was only 5%. 
18 In October 1987, the Netherlands subsidiary established a branch office in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles, in order to further reduce 
Netherlands income tax on the interest payments that it received from the U.S. subsidiaries. 
19 DeGroote, Haworth, and Cairns were directors of L_Investments and its officers included DeGroote as president, Haworth as vice 
president for finance, and Cairns as vice president and secretary. Jerry Pekaruk was controller and reported to Haworth. 
20 DeGroote was a director of L_Netherlands during the years in issue. L_Netherlands had other directors, including Netherlands 
residents. 
21 The funds used to make the advances sometimes came from Laidlaw’s own retained earnings, sometimes from loans received by 
Laidlaw or its subsidiaries from commercial banks, and sometimes, as here, from sales of Laidlaw equity to the public. 
22 Laidlaw owned 100% of the outstanding stock of L_Investments at all times. 
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By the August 31, 1988, advances to the U.S. Subsidiaries totaled: 
 
L_Waste:              $ 231,455,000 
L_Industries:           603,157,613  
L_Tree totaled:          20,000,000 
                               $854,612,613 
 
L-Netherlands kept books in The Netherlands in which it recorded its lending and borrowing transactions, 
capital contributions, income, and expenses.  L-Netherlands reported the interest payments it received from the U.S. 
Subsidiaries as interest income subject to The Netherlands' income tax.  L-Netherlands paid small amounts of 
income tax to The Netherlands in 1986, 1987, and 1988.  The U.S. Subsidiaries recorded the advances received from 
L_Netherlands as loans on their books and in their financial statements, and treated all interest payments as interest 
expense on their financial statements and on the consolidated tax return of the L_US and L_Industries groups.
23
   
 
Interest reinvestment loans 
 
On the same day that L_Netherlands received “interest payments” from the U.S. Subsidiaries, it would loan 
all or most of these amounts back to the U.S. Subsidiaries as “interest reinvestment loans.”  The August 28, 1986 
interest payments made by L_Transit and L_Waste was typical. 
 
 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
to L_Netherlands
L_Netherlands to 
U.S. Subsidiaries
8/28/1986 8/28/1986
L_Waste 573,958$             -$                    
L_Transit 1,630,716$          2,204,674$          
2,204,674$          2,204,674$           
 
 
1. L_Industries borrowed $573,958 from Royal Bank of Canada.  
2. L_Industries loaned $573,958 to L_Waste and wired that money to L_Waste’s account at ABN Bank (New 
York). 
3. L_Waste transferred the $573,958 to L_Netherlands’ account at ABN Bank (New York).  
4. L_Transit transferred $1,630,716 to L_Netherlands ABN Bank (New York) account.  
5. L-Netherlands transferred $2,204,674 from its ABN Bank (New York) account to L_Transit’s commercial 
account at Royal Bank of Canada. 
 
 
During the years in issue, 90% of the total interest payments made by the U.S. Subsidiaries were loaned 
back to the U.S. subsidiaries as interest reinvestment loans.  L_Netherlands used the interest payments it retained to 
pay its operating costs, Dutch income taxes, and to make distributions to L_Investments.  
                                                          
23 This fact is of little practical significance in that under U.S. and Canadian accounting standards, all of the entities depicted in Figure 1 
were members of the same consolidated group and all intercompany loans, income, expenses, etc. were eliminated in the preparation of Laidlaw’s 
consolidated financial statements. 
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From Transit
From Laidlaw-
Waste
From Laidlaw-
Tree
To Laidlaw-
Transit
To Laidlaw-
Waste
5/29/1986 809,057$           179,740$           -$                     988,797$           988,797$           
8/28/1986 1,630,716          573,958             -                       2,204,674          2,204,674          
11/25/1986 3,097,820          2,772,450          -                       5,870,270          5,870,270          
2/25/1987 4,003,389          7,532,238          -                       11,535,627        11,535,627        
5/28/1987 4,479,972          7,988,179          -                       12,468,151        12,468,151        
8/31/1987 5,071,716          10,297,291        546,667             15,915,674        15,280,674        
11/30/1987 5,705,723          10,597,883        549,028             16,852,634        16,700,000        
2/29/1988 6,346,874          11,991,976        539,583             18,878,433        12,448,000$      
5/31/1988 7,534,621          15,015,471        542,499             23,092,591        21,045,000        
8/31/1988 8,580,485          16,546,460        581,666             25,708,611        22,000,000        
47,260,373$      83,495,646$      2,759,443$        133,515,462$     86,093,193$      34,448,000$      
Figure 2
Interest Payments and "Interest Reinvestment" Loans
Totals: $120,541,193$133,515,462
Interest Reinvestment Loan 
From Laidlaw-International
Interest Payment Claimed to Have Been Made to 
Laidlaw-International
Total Claimed 
Payments (and 
Total Deducted 
on U.S. Tax 
Returns)
 
 
 
By August 31, 1988, the U.S. Subsidiaries owed L_Netherlands a total of $975,153,806 in advances and 
interest reinvestment loans.
24
   
 
 
Transit Waste Tree
FY 8608 118,893,471$      29,000,000$        -$                 147,893,471$      
FY 8708 88,954,722$        376,212,613$      20,000,000$      485,167,335$      
FY 8808 109,700,000$      232,393,000$      -$                 342,093,000$      
Total 317,548,193$      637,605,613$      20,000,000$      975,153,806$      
Figure 3
December, 1985 through August, 198810
Advances By Leadlaw-International
Borrower
Total
 
 
 
Uses of the L_Netherlands Advances 
 
 L_Transit 
o L_Transit used the funds advanced to it by L_Netherlands to acquire the stock and assets of 44 
U.S. companies in the transportation industry and to expand their respective operations.  
 L_Waste 
o L_Waste used $349.8 million of the advances from L_Netherlands to purchase all of the stock 
GSX on October 14, 1986.   
o Another $60.9 million of the advances were initially made to L_Industries on December 16, 1987 
and used buy back the 21% of its stock held by the public in December of 1987.  This obligation 
was assumed by L-Waste later that same day. 
o The balance of the advances made by L_Netherlands to L-Waste were used primarily to acquire 
30 companies in the solid waste services industry and to expand their respective operations. 
                                                          
24 L_Netherlands continued to advance money to L_US, L_Transit, L_Waste, L_Tree, and other L_US subsidiaries after August 31, 
1988.  By December 31, 1994, L_Netherlands had advanced a total of  $1,393,383,974 to Laidlaw’s U.S. subsidiaries. 
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 L_Tree 
o Laidlaw Acquisition Corporation (“L_Acquisition”) borrowed $20 million from L_Netherlands on 
May 27, 1987 and used these amounts to purchase all of the stock of L_Tree ($16 million) and to 
refinance third-party loans relating to L_Tree’s purchase of rolling stock ($4 million).  
Immediately after the acquisition, L_Tree assumed the L_Acquisition’s $20 million obligation to 
L_Netherlands and L_Acquisition liquidated into L_U.S.  
 
General Terms and Conditions of Loan Agreements   
 
Throughout the years in issue, DeGroote, Haworth, and Cairns significantly influenced and directed 
L_Netherland’s lending decisions and operations.  During this period, L_Netherlands' managing directors met 12 
times. DeGroote was present at four of the meetings and voted by proxy at eight. Haworth was present at three of 
those meetings and Cairns was present at two.  Additionally, L_Investments' proxies at shareholder meetings for 
L_Netherlands included specific instructions about future transactions.  Cairns and Haworth signed, on behalf of the 
U.S. Subsidiaries, all of the loan agreements, promissory notes, and assignments of transactions between 
L_Netherlands and the U.S. Subsidiaries.   
 
Laidlaw's counsel, Cairns, wrote the first draft of all of the L_Netherlands loan agreements.  Initially, the 
agreements between L_Netherlands and the U.S. subsidiaries receiving the advances provided that  (a) the 
borrower’s obligation to pay interest and principal was unconditional, (b) the loan must be repaid on or before a 
fixed date or on demand, (c) the interest rate was fixed and the borrower’s/guarantor’s obligation to pay interest was 
unconditional and neither the timing or amount was contingent on whether the borrower (or the guarantor) had any 
income or whether it made any dividend distributions, (d) L_US would guarantee all loans made to L_Tree and 
L_Transit, and L_Industries would guarantee all loans made to L_Waste,
25
 (d) L_Netherlands' rights were senior to 
the rights of the stockholders of the borrower and the guarantor, and (e) the loan could not be converted into the 
stock of the borrower.  Advances made by L_Netherlands to the U.S. Subsidiaries were not subordinated to loans 
made by commercial banks.  L_Transit was required to maintain and long-term debt to equity ratio of no more than 
2:1 and a current assets to current liabilities ratio of no less that 1:1.  L_Waste agreed to limit its debt to equity ratio 
to no more than 2.5:1. 
 
These initial loan agreements did not require the directors of the L_Waste or L_Transit to make periodic 
principal payments, but they did permit the borrower to convert the loans to 5-year term loans on or before 
September 1, 1988, the maturity date on which the entire principal amount would otherwise be due.  In all events, 
L_Netherlands could demand repayment of the entire outstanding at any time if it needed the funds.  These 
agreements did not require the borrower or its guarantor to create a reserve or sinking fund to assure the timely 
repayment of the advances.   
 
Throughout the years in issue, Laidlaw, L_US, L_Industries, L_Waste, and L_Tree had substantial credit 
lines and outstanding loans from unrelated commercial banks.  The terms of these loans, detailed more fully below, 
established leverage ratio criteria.  Generally, the borrower’s consolidated total debt-to-equity ratio could not exceed 
2:1 and its working capital ratio (current assets over current liabilities) could not fall below 1:1.  L_US and/or 
L_Industries guaranteed repayment of all advances from commercial banks to L_Transit, L_Tree, and L_Waste. 
 
The $349.8 million debt-financed acquisition of GSX on October 14, 1986 caused Laidlaw, L_US, and 
L_Industries to become highly leveraged and in technical default on their loans from commercial lenders. 
Consequently, on October 16, 1986, in order to prevent default, Haworth (in a letter written on L_US letterhead) 
informed the directors of L_Netherlands that its loan agreements with the U.S. Subsidiaries would have to be 
amended to subordinate the repayment of those advances (and interest) to the loans received by Laidlaw and its 
subsidiaries from commercial banks.  Also in that letter, Haworth instructed the L_Netherlands board to approve the 
                                                          
25 Although Laidlaw guaranteed repayment of loans made by unrelated commercial lenders to the U.S. Subsidiaries, it did not guarantee 
repayment of loans that L-Netherlands made to the U.S. Subsidiaries. 
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following amendments to existing and future loan agreements between L_Netherlands and the U.S. Subsidiaries, and 
to make those amendments retroactive back to September 1, 1986:      
 
 “(a) All sums to be due on demand at interest rates equal to ABN Bank (New York) prime plus 2 percent, 
payable on the last business days of each fiscal quarter.  
 “(b) Remove all financial ratio covenants.  
 “(c) Remove the „ceilings‟ so that no limits will exist. All loans will be provided as requested but subjected 
to availabilities of [L_Netherlands]'s funds.  
 “(d) In the case of [L_U.S.]'s subsidiaries, there will be two loan accounts established, one called principal 
account and the other called reinvested interest account.  
 “(e) To facilitate the quarterly and other changes in loan amounts, all increases/decreases would be 
entered on a grid promissory note. This system allows the lender to adjust the promissory note 
automatically without issuing a new note.” 
 
These amendments were unanimously approved by the L_Netherlands board on October 20, 1986 and 
given retroactive effect back to September 1, 1986. 
 
On July 7, 1987, the agreements were further modified, retroactively back to September 1, 1986, to 
eliminate the demand feature, to add some enforcement provisions (including an acceleration clause in the event of 
default), and to postpone the due date for the payment of principal by one year to September 1, 1989, “unless the 
parties extended the due date by written agreement.”  
 
On September 12, 1988, the members of the L_Netherlands board of directors discussed repayment by 
advances made to the U.S. Subsidiaries.  At that time, the advances were due to be repaid on September 1, 1989.  
The board decided to extend the repayment date.  The minutes for that meeting stated that L_Netherlands’ 
management did not intend to request repayment.  In fact, from the date of the initial advance through October, 
1989, none of the principal amounts of the advances or the interest reinvestment loans had been repaid.
26
  
 
Comparison of Loans from Commercial Banks with Loans from L_Netherlands  
 
Similarities.  The commercial bank loans and L_Netherlands advances for the years in issue were in writing.  All 
were for general corporate purposes or for the acquisition of other businesses.  All had some representations and 
warranties to the bank or L_Netherlands about the financial conditions of the borrower.  All required corporate 
existence and authority, punctual payments, some type of periodic reporting, and notice of default.  All imposed 
limitations on further encumbering any security.  All treated nonpayment, incorrect or false representations, 
noncompliance with material terms and conditions, insolvency or bankruptcy, and other similar events as a default.  
Most had cross-default clauses and acceleration clauses.  Most were guaranteed by a parent.  All allowed 
prepayment without penalty.  
 
Differences.  Commercial bank loans always had borrowing limits.  The amounts that the U.S. Subsidiaries could 
borrow from L_Netherlands was generally not limited.  Commercial banks lent substantially less to the U.S. 
Subsidiaries than L_Netherlands advanced to them.  Over half of the L_Netherlands advances were more than $100 
million, but most of the bank loans were substantially less than $100 million. Bank loans were generally for a 5-year 
period and no bank loan had a demand feature.  L_Netherlands advances were generally not payable over a fixed 
term and generally had demand features.  L_Netherlands generally did not require the U.S. Subsidiaries to make 
quarterly or semiannual payments of principal, but did allow balloon payments.  Commercial banks required 
quarterly or semiannual payments of principal and did not allow balloon payments.  Commercial banks required 
minimum debt-to-equity and current-assets-to-current-liabilities ratios.  L_Netherlands, after September 1, 1986, 
generally did not.  
 
                                                          
26 As of the date that this case went to trial in 1997, the U.S. Subsidiaries had not reduced the total unpaid balances that they owed to 
L_Netherlands below the $975,153,806 which was outstanding as of August 31, 1988. 
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The guaranties differed in that the commercial banks required that the guarantors to post collateral and that 
they meet financial requirements.  L_Netherlands did not.  
 
Only bank loans had negative covenants that limited the use of the borrowed funds, or placed limitations on 
a change of the borrower's business or on asset dispositions.  L_Netherlands advances did not.  Commercial bank 
loans generally had more covenants and warranties relating to the borrower's legal status and activities (e.g., 
compliance with ERISA and securities laws) than L_Netherlands advances.  Banks treated material adverse changes 
in the borrower's operations or financial condition, certain judgments, and liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of 
the borrower's business as events of default.  L_Netherlands did not.  
 
Audit of LTL by Canadian Tax Authorities  
 
Canadian income tax authorities audited Laidlaw for 1987 and 1988. In connection with that audit, Laidlaw 
represented that:  “Laidlaw Inc. acts as a conduit in providing funds for its operating subsidiaries. The funds are 
used by the subsidiaries as working capital and for capital acquisitions. Without these funds, the subsidiaries would 
be seriously undercapitalized. The loans are in the nature of capital contributions to the subsidiaries.” 
 
Discussion Questions  
 
Background 
 
1. In what ways do the income tax and financial accounting treatment of “debt” (and “interest”) and “equity” 
(and “dividends”) differ?  What is the practical significance of each of these differences? 
2. “Substance” over “Form”:  Assume the following facts: 
 F is the sole shareholder of a regular corporation that is taxable at the combined federal and state 
tax rate of 40%.  F’s personal tax rate for federal and state income taxes is 45%.  The corporation 
pays a lump-sum $100,000 salary to S, one of its employees, on June 15th of the current year.  
This is S’s only income for the year and it is subject to an effective combined federal and state 
income tax rate of 30%. 
 To the naked eye, the corporation should be entitled to a $100,000 salary expense deduction that 
will save it $40,000 in federal and state income taxes.   S should report $100,000 of ordinary 
salary income on his tax return for the year and pay a total of $30,000 of income taxes on that 
amount. 
 But what if you learned that F is the father of S? What if S is 18 years old and graduated from high 
school on June 15
th
 and will attend a private college the following fall?   And what if the only 
service that S has ever performed for the corporation was to spend a couple of hours each Saturday 
morning in May sweeping up the factory floor?   
 Can the Internal Revenue Service ignore the form of a transaction and the descriptive labels (e.g., 
“salary”) used by the parties?  If so, what tax consequences might you expect to result to the 
corporation, to F, and to S in the light of these additional facts?  
3. “Debt” versus “Equity:  Generally, what are some of the attributes of “debt” that distinguish it from 
“equity”?  What additional facts and circumstances might be probative in distinguishing “debt” from 
“equity”? 
4. Is it legal and ethical for individuals and corporations to arrange their affairs and structure their transactions 
in ways that eliminate, minimize or postpone their tax liability?   
 
Laidlaw‟s Intercompany “Debt” 
 
1. The principal issue in this case was whether the amounts loaned by L_Netherlands to the U.S. Subsidiaries 
were, in substance, equity, rather than debt.  If these amounts were held to be capital contributions, then all 
or a part of the $133,515,459 denominated as “interest” and deducted by the U.S. Subsidiaries in 
computing their U.S. income tax liabilities would be re-classified as nondeductible dividend distributions 
and the U.S. Subsidiaries would be liable for over $45 million in additional income taxes, plus interest and 
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penalties on those taxes.  Furthermore, under the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty, interest paid by a U.S. debtor 
to a foreign corporation was not subject to U.S. withholding taxes, whereas dividends paid to foreign 
shareholders were subject to a 5% withholding tax.  Discuss the respective merits of Laidlaw’s contention 
that these loans were in form and in substance bona fide “debt” and the government’s contention that they 
were in substance “equity.” 
2. Even if the Taxpayer prevailed on the debt-versus-equity issue, it would also have to deal with Section 
267(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code under which accrual method taxpayers are generally not entitled to 
a deduction for expenses owed to related parties until those expenses were actually “paid.”  The issue here 
would be whether the “payments” made by the U.S. Subsidiaries to L_Netherlands and immediately loaned 
back to them constituted “payment” as that term was used in Section 267(a)(2).  Your thoughts? 
3. If you concluded either that (1) the “loans” were in substance “equity” or that (2) the interest paid and then 
re-loaned back to the U.S. Subsidiaries was not in substance “paid” (as required by Section 267(a)(2)),  
then discuss the ethics and the legality (an attempt at legitimate “tax avoidance” or approaching or even 
crossing the line into criminal “tax evasion”) of the strategy crafted by Coopers and Lybrand and 
implemented by the Laidlaw executives.   
 
Please see table on next page. 
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Fiscal Year Ending: 8508 8608 8708 8808
Tangible Net Worth 57,022,000$          84,341,000$          42,659,000$          (22,630,000)$         
Quick Ratio** 0.93 1.12 1.3 1.17
Current Ratio* 1.33 1.62 1.62 1.32
Debt/Equity Ratio† 0.59 0.67 3.54 8.43
Liabilities/Equity Ratio 0.87 0.89 4.05 9.42
Liab./Tang. Net Worth Ratio 1.38 1.31 13.35 N/A
EBIT/Interest Expense‡ 8.93 7.89 1.9 1.65
Free Cash Flow+ N/A (3,177,391)$           (294,312,141)$       (67,858,322)$         
(EBITDA-CAPEX)/Interest Expense 0.94 -0.77 -7.81 -1.16
Fiscal Year Ending: 8508 8608 8708 8808
Tangible Net Worth 18,865,000$          28,400,000$          (33,204,000)$         (58,027,000)$         
Quick Ratio** 87 0.76 0.83 1.02
Current Ratio* 1.16 1.36 1.12 1.58
Debt/Equity Ratio† 1.61 2.26 5.78 5.63
Liabilities/Equity Ratio 2.76 3.26 7.29 6.44
Liab./Tang. Net Worth Ratio 9.93 12.02 N/A N/A
EBIT/Interest Expense‡ 7.14 3.38 1.82 1.5
Free Cash Flow+ N/A  $        (63,490,919) (351,973,233)$        $      (109,555,409)
(EBITDA-CAPEX)/Interest Expense -4.04 -3.92 -6.15 -1.19
Fiscal Year Ending: 8508 8608 8708 8808
Tangible Net Worth (7,020,000)$           (18,734,000)$         (21,529,000)$         (56,284,000)$         
Quick Ratio** 0.13 0.4 0.77 0.81
Current Ratio* 0.22 0.57 1.13 1.11
Debt/Equity Ratio† 9.94 10.52 9.43 15.44
Liabilities/Equity Ratio 11.17 11.71 10.66 16.87
Liab./Tang. Net Worth Ratio N/A N/A N/A N/A
EBIT/Interest Expense‡ 2.66 1.98 1.59 1.06
Fiscal Year Ending: 8508 8608 8708 8808
Tangible Net Worth -$                     4,354,000$            (11,666,000)$         (5,711,000)$           
Quick Ratio** - 1.4 1.16 1.47
Current Ratio* - 1.53 1.23 1.61
Debt/Equity Ratio† - 0.87 95.86 3.09
Liabilities/Equity Ratio - 1.54 109.84 3.43
Liab./Tang. Net Worth Ratio - 1.55 N/A N/A
EBIT/Interest Expense‡ - 8.3 1.85 1.00
 ‡ 
EBIT is earnings before interestexpense and taxes
Available Financial Data
#
 + 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) less capital expenditures (CAPEX). 
 * “Current ratio” is current assets (cash and equivalents, receivables, and inventories) divided by current liabilities.
 ** “Quick ratio” is cash and equivalents and receivables, or current assets less inventories, divided by current liabilities.
 † 
Laidlaw's competitors in the waste services industry during 1987 and 1988 generally had debt to equity ratios below 2 to 1.
 #  
Financial data for L_Waste was unavailable, but financial data for L-Industries, its immediate parent, and L_US, L_Industries 
00immediate parent, was available and is included in this chart.
L-Transit
L-Tree
L_ Industries
L-US
Journal of Business & Economics Research  Volume 2, Number 10 
 68 
Notes 
